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WHEN CAUSE-IN-FACT Is MORE THAN A FACT: THE
MALONE-GREEN DEBATE ON THE ROLE OF POLICY IN
DETERMINING FACTUAL CAUSATION IN TORT LAW
Like Lewis Carroll's snark, cause-in-fact is not easy to describe or
locate.' Even when we feel that we have grasped it, more often than not
we are left clutching just another boojum or perhaps thin air. And like
Carroll's snark hunters, lawyers and legal scholars have doggedly pur-
sued the elusive concept of cause-in-fact; they have rarely, however, cap-
tured it in words adequate to define it or to describe what tort goals it
serves. Wex Malone and Leon Green have been more successful than many
of these pursuers; each has produced incisive, influential studies of the
cause-in-fact requirement as it functions in its tort habitat.2 Professor
Malone, however, was the one to recognize that once ensnared in the
tangled facts of hard cases, factual cause often turns out, upon closer
scrutiny, to be another species of cause entirely-legal or proximate cause.
Both scholars have been instrumental in the reception of the duty-
risk analysis in Louisiana's tort law-Green as deviser of the method and
Malone as one of its most authoritative advocates.3 Not surprisingly,
however, the two scholars have differed in certain details of the analysis,
especially with respect to the nature and the role of cause-in-fact within
both the duty-risk scheme and the tort action in general. Although the
Louisiana Supreme Court has committed Louisiana tort jurisprudence to
the duty-risk analysis, the court has yet to provide definitive guidance
on the best means of handling cause-in-fact within the duty-risk scheme.'
Copyright 1984, by LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW.
1. Although Lewis Carrol never attempted to define "snark," the compiler of a famous
nineteenth-century dictionary did.
The imaginary animal invented by Lewis Carroll as the subject of his mock-heroic
poem The Hunting of the Snark (1876). It was most elusive and gave endless
trouble, and when eventually the hunters thought they had tracked it down their
quarry proved to be but a Boojum. The name [Snark] has sometimes been given
to the quests of dreamers and visionaries.
E. BREWER, BREWER'S DICTIONARY OF PHRASE AND FABLE: CENTENARY EDITION 1014 (1.
Evans ed. 1970).
2. See, e.g., Green, The Causal Relation Issue in Negligence Law, 60 MICH. L. REV.
543, 561 (1962); Malone, Ruminations on Cause-In-Fact, 9 STAN. L. REV. 60 (1956).
3. See, e.g., Johnson, Comparative Negligence and the Duty/Risk Analysis, 40 LA.
L. REV. 319, 341 (1980).
4. The Louisiana Supreme Court has sampled the gamut of cause-in-fact tests without
settling on any one test or indicating whether one test is to be preferred in bench trials
and another in jury trials. See, e.g., Sinitiere v. Lavergne, 391 So. 2d 821, 826 (La. 1980)
(using but-for test to determine cause-in-fact); Vonner v. State Dep't of Pub. Welfare, 273
So. 2d 252, 255 (La. 1973) (endorsing the substantial-factor test); Laird v. Travelers Ins.
Co., 263 La. 199, 209-10, 267 So. 2d 714, 717-18 (1972) (gauging cause-in-fact by a test
combining elements of but-for and substantial-factor); Hill v. Lundin & Assocs., 260 La.
542, 547, 256 So. 2d 620, 622 (1972) (using a Greenian "contributed in any way," "had
something to do with" test of causal relation); Dixie Drive It Yourself Sys. v. American
Beverage Co., 242 La. 471, 482, 137 So. 2d 298, 302 (1962) (blending the substantial-factor
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Therefore, the Malone-Green debate over the role of policy considera-
tions in determining cause-in-fact has particular relevance for the Loui-
siana lawyer. As this article will demonstrate, Wex Malone's insightful
ruminations on cause-in-fact provide the best guidance for Louisiana's
courts in handling the causal requirement in both bench and jury trials.
To understand the differences between Green's and Malone's positions
on cause-in-fact, however, one must first appreciate the setting within
which the duty-risk method had its genesis.
Origins of the Duty-Risk Analysis
Leon Green and the American Legal Realist movement came to in-
tellectual maturity in the same decade, the 1920's.' Althouglb Dean Green
has been denominated a Legal Realist by numerous tort scholars,6 there
has been some argument over whether he considered himself a member
of the group.' Of his dedication to the principles clustered under the title
"Legal Realism," however, there has been no doubt: Leon Green and
the Legal Realists stood in sharp reaction against the arid formalism of
late nineteenth- and early twentieth-century tort law.'
Not until the rise of the collegiate law school in the late nineteenth
and but-for tests). The supreme court has indicated that the causal issue should be un-
colored by any evaluative or social policy factors. See, e.g., Shelton v. Aetna Casualty &
Sur. Co., 334 So. 2d 406, 409 (La. 1976). It is, however, a theme of this article and of
Professor Malone's "Cause-In-Fact" essay, see supra note 2, that such a rigid segregation
of factual and evaluative factors may, in certain cases, impede the judge or jury from reaching
a just decision. In this connection, it is interesting to note that every time the Louisiana
appellate courts have cited Professor Malone's "Cause-In-Fact" essay, they have adduced
it for the proposition that the courts must set the scope of defendant's duty, not for its
main thesis on the nature of cause-in-fact and causal tests. See, e.g., LeBlanc v. State,
419 So. 2d 853, 855 (La. 1982); Callais v. Allstate Ins. Co., 334 So. 2d 692, 700-01 (La.
1976) (on reh'g).
5. G. WHITE, TORT LAW IN AMERICA: AN INTELLECTUAL HISTORY 75 (1980).
6. See, e.g., J. FRANK, LAW AND THE MODERN MIND 6, 283 (1930); E. PURCELL, THE
CRISIS OF DEMOCRATIC THEORY: SCIENTIFIC NATURALISM & THE PROBLEM OF VALUE 80 (1973);
W. RUMBLE, AMERICAN LEGAL REALISM 196-97 (1968); G. WHITE, supra note 5, at 75, 92;
Bechtler, American Legal Realism Revaluated, in LAw IN A SOCALL CONTEXT 1, 18 (T. Bechtler
ed. 1978); Llewellyn, Some Realism About Realism-Responding to Dean Pound, 44 HARv.
L. REV. 1222, 1226 n.18 (1931); Probert, Causation in the Negligence Jargon: A Plea for
Balanced "Realism," 18 U. FLA. L. REV. 369, 391 (1965); Smith, Some Realism About
a Grand Legal Realist: Leon Green, 56 TEX. L. REV. 479, 479-80 (1978).
7. See, e.g., Robertson, The Legal Philosophy of Leon Green, 56 TEX. L. REV. 393,
399-400, 400 n.29, 403 (1978). Professor Robertson demonstrated that Green had few formal
or philosophical connections with the Yale and Columbia Legal Realists. If Green's strug-
gles against the metaphysical cant of proximate cause drew him into alliance with the cam-
paign for realistic appraisals of the law in action, it was only because his native genius
led him to the same low estimate of a formalistic judicial process as that held by the Realist
professors.
8. See generally G. GILMORE, THE AGES OF AMERICAN LAW 77-91 (1977); E. PURCELL,
supra note 6, chs. 1, 5, 9; G. WHITE, supra note 5, at 75-83, 91-113.
1520 [Vol. 44
19841 NOTES 1521
century did anything resembling a discrete, recognizable category of tort
law exist in America. Indeed, one modern historian has argued that the
theory of negligence liability sprang fully armed from the brow of Pro-
fessor Oliver Wendell Holmes. According to G. Edward White, those in
the vanguard of the "law as science" movement, but especially Holmes,
prescinded from the loose "collection of writs" 9 that was "torts" an in-
choate fault principle which they transformed into a universal and un-
ifying theory of liability; by this principle they created the new legal
paradigm of negligence to govern the new legal realm of tort." Most legal
historians maintain that this promotion of negligence to the ruling tort
standard was an instrumental use of the law calculated to encourage (some
use the epithet "subsidize") nineteenth-century industrialism and venture
capitalism." An integral component of this legal subsidy, along with the
unholy trinity of the fellow-servant rule, contributory negligence, and
assumption of risk, was the doctrine of proximate cause.' 2 So important
was it as an exculpatory or liability-limiting rule that it has often been
referred to as the "defense of proximate cause." 3 As part of the reaction
9. G. WHITE, supra note 5, at 232.
10. Id. at 12-19, 231-32; see also L. FRIEDMAN, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAW 228,
409-10 (1973); M. HORWITZ, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW, .1780-1860, at 94-99
(1977); Gregory, Trespass to Negligence to Absolute Liability, 37 VA. L. REV. 359, 363-64,
377-79, 382 (1951); McClung, In Defense of Reasonableness: A Critical Analysis of Monolithic
Theories of Tort Liability, 22 S. TEX. L.J. 1, 1-6 (1982); Malone, Ruminations on the Role
of Fault in the History of the Common Law of Torts, 31 LA. L. REv. 1, 18 (1970) [hereinafter
cited as Malone, Ruminations on Fault]; Malone, Some Ruminations on Contributory
Negligence, 1981 UTAH L. REV. 91, 96-97 [hereinafter cited as Malone, Contributory
Negligence].
11. J. FLEMING, THE LAW OF TORTS 97-98 (6th ed. 1983); L. FREIDMAN, supra note
10, at 409-27 (nineteenth-century tort doctrines protected entrepreneurial activities from
liability); M. HORWITZ, supra note 10, at 85-99, 253-54; Gregory, supra note 10, at 368,
382, 385; Laitos, Continuities from the Past Affecting Resource Use and Conservation
Patterns, 28 OKLA. L. REV. 60, 80-88 (1975); Malone, Ruminations on Fault, supra note
10, at 40-41 (industrialism spurred growth of fault requirement for tort recovery in nineteenth-
century England). See generally Malone, The Formative Era of Contributory Negligence,
41 ILL. L. REV. 151 (1946). But see Friedman & Ladinsky, Social Change and the Law
of Industrial Accidents, 67 COLUM. L. REV. 50, 53-54 (1967); Rabin, The Historical Develop-
ment of the Fault Principle: A Reinterpretation, 15 GA. L. REV. 925 (1981) (arguing that
as America became progressively industrialized, courts more and more came to hold cor-
porate enterprises responsible for injuries); Schwartz, Tort Law and the Economy in
Nineteenth-Century America: A Reinterpretation, 90 YALE L.J. 1717 (1981) (disputing the
economic subsidy thesis).
12. The proximate or legal cause issue consists in a demarcation of liability by balanc-
ing the protection to be afforded the plaintiff's interest against the hazard and the -utility
of defendant's conduct. L. GREEN, RATIONALE OF PROXIMATE CAUSE 11-13 (1927). For the
assorted issues that have accumulated under the rubric of proximate cause, see Prosser,
Proximate Cause in California, 38 CALIF. L. REV. 369, 374 (1950).
13. See, e.g., L. GREEN, TRAFIIC VICTIMS: TORT LAW AND INSURANCE 70 (1958); Green,
The Negligence Action, 1974 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 369-70, 381; Green & Smith, Negligence Law,
No-Fault, and Jury Trial-Il, 50 TEX. L. RE. 1297-99, 1301 (1972); Hovenkamp, Pragmatic
Realism and Proximate Cause in America, 3 J. LEGAL HIST. 3, 4 (1982).
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against tort law's subsidy to industry, the Legal Realists, led by Leon
Green, conducted a penetrating critique of the doctrinaire metaphysics
of proximate cause.'
4
Green realized that, as used by the appellate courts, proximate cause
could be likened to the medieval alchemist's "universal solvent" which
was so potent it dissolved every container devised to hold it. Since no
trial court decision could withstand the corrosiveness of proximate cause,
jury trial had effectively been replaced by appellate trial.'5 To understand
the radicalism of Leon Green's views on causation, one need only note
the language he used in waging his "campaign" against proximate cause
and the language used by scholars to describe his effort-both sources
are interlaced with martial imagery." This phraseology captures the spirit
of Green and the Legal Realists: they were engaged in a war against a
petrified legal conceptualism. This "crusade mentality" goes a long way
towards explaining Green's extreme and in some ways untenable position
on the role of cause-in-fact in tort law.
Leon Green and the Bifurcation of Proximate Cause
In stark contrast to the causation-bound inquiry of proximate cause,
the duty-risk analysis aims to delineate and clarify the controlling issues
in tort cases," largely by the division of the proximate cause issue into
14. L. GREEN, supra note 12, at 136 ("The myth of 'proximate cause' finds its only
rivals in those of theological origin."); G. WHrTE, supra note 5, at 92.
15. Green, supra note 2, at 561; Smith, supra note 6, at 500 ("Beginning with The
Rationale of Proximate Cause in 1927 down to the present, [Green] has attacked the doc-
trine as an' impermissible tool of legal analysis and thought that cripples the legitimate legal
aspirations of plaintiffs.").
16. See, e.g., L. GREEN, supra note 12, at 39 ("So far the attempt has been merely
to clear the way for a serious attack upon the principal redoubts of 'proximate cause'
which are to be found in negligence cases."); Robertson, supra note 7, at 397 ("[Wjhen
confronted with verbal corruption-word-schemes wildly out of joint with the apparent facts
of litigation and life-[Green] assumed that it was up to him to do battle with this preten-
tious clutter." (emphasis added)); Smith, supra note 6, at 500 (noting that Green "attacked"
the doctrine of proximate cause).
Thus, Leon Green had this in common with the Legal Realists to whom he is often
linked: he attempted to replace transcendental nonsense with the functional approach to
law. Hessel Yntema referred to the animus behind this development as "the Copernican
discovery that law is a practical science." Yntema, Jurisprudence and Metaphysics-A
Triangular Correspondence, 59 YALE L.J. 273, 273 (1950). See also G. WHITE, supra note
5, at 75; Burrus, American Legal Realism, 8 How. L.J. 36, 41-42 (1962).
17. L. GREEN, supra note 12, at 122.
In most American state courts [factual causation] is combined with other issues,
usually false issues such as proximate cause, legal cause, and the like, or com-
bined with the negligence foreseeability formula, thereby submerging the causal
relation issue in a complex of doctrinal terminology that serves primarily as a
source of errors for appellate review and frequent reversals.
Green, supra note 1, at 561 (footnote omitted).
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two distinct issues-cause-in-fact and duty. The Green methodology first
confines the causation issue to a neutral, purely scientific inquiry, namely,
cause-in-fact or what Green calls either causal relation or causal
connection." Second, Green reformulated the legal or proximate cause
question as the "duty" or "scope of duty" issue; this question of whether
the plaintiff's interest warrants protection-the limits of responsibility
question-was to be answered by the express use of policy considerations
to mark the metes and bounds of the defendant's duty through risk in-
clusion and exclusion.' 9 The conviction behind Green's splitting the atom
of proximate cause 0 was his belief that policy factors should be driven
from the cover of "causation" and made to do service in the open,2'
and it was this conviction that made the bifurcated causal inquiry the
keystone of the present duty-risk structure.
Leon Green advanced two further reasons for the bifurcation of prox-
imate cause, reasons which are actually opposite sides of the same coin.
First, cause-in-fact is the threshhold problem whose resolution should
precede any consideration of the responsibility issues of duty and breach.
In order to facilitate this purely factual inquiry (and at the same time
unburden the later policy inquiry), Green recommended the exclusion of
all liability and policy concerns from the province of causal relation. 22
Second, Green thought that this dissociation of factual and legal cause
likewise would clarify the policy-centered "duty" analysis by excluding
the jargon of proximateness and remoteness, with its innuendo that a ques-
tion of merely physical causation was under review.23
18. L. GREEN, supra note 12, at 132; Green, supra note 2, at 548.
19. L. GREEN, supra note 12, at 66, 69, 71. As commonly expressed, there are four
stages or steps to the duty-risk analysis:
(1) Is there a factual connection between plaintiff's injury and defendant? (2)
Does the legal system's protection extend to the interest that plaintiff seeks to
vindicate; and if some protection is afforded what standard of care does the legal
system impose on the defendant? (3) Was that standard of care breached by the
defendant [when he harmed plaintiff's protected interest]? (4) What are the
damages?
Thode, Tort Analysis: Duty-Risk v. Proximate Cause and the Rational Allocation of Func-
tions Between Judge and Jury, 1977 UTAH L. REv. 1, 1. See also Green, supra note 2,
at 546; Green & Smith, Negligence Law, No-Fault, and Jury Trial-I, 50 TEX. L. REv.
1093, 1106 (1972).
20. For references to Green's "atomistic" view of causation, see H. HART & A.
HONORS, CAUSATION IN THE LAW 98, 262 (1959); Crowe, The Anatomy of a Tort-Greenian,
as Interpreted by Crowe Who Has Been Influenced by Malone-A Primer, 22 Loy. L. REv.
903, 904 (1976). The metaphor is employed to convey the idea that Green split "proximate
cause" into the discrete issues of "legal cause" and "cause-in-fact."
21. Green, Are There Dependable Rules of Causation?, 77 U. PA. L. Rav. 601, 627-28
(1929); Green, supra note 2, at 545-46, 561.
22. Treece, Leon Green and the Judicial Process: Government of the People, by the
People, and for the People, 56 TEX. L. REV. 447, 459 (1978).
23. See, e.g., Green, Proximate Cause in Texas Negligence Law (pt. 1), 28 TEx. L.
REv. 471 (1950).
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Part of nineteenth-century jurists' problems in recognizing and draw-
ing the distinction between factual and proximate causation arose because
the global term "cause" served double duty. As Wex Malone explained:
"At the close of the [nineteenth] century courts used the term 'cause'
indiscriminately to express either their conclusion as to 'what happened'
or as a means of explaining what law 'ought to do about it.' "24 The
essence of the duty-risk approach lay in its clarification of the litigation
process through the precise division of cause into its scientific, physical,
factual half and its social-policy half. Clarity of expression, Green and
the other Legal Realists believed, would produce clarity of thought and
justness of decision.2
As a natural consequence of his atomization of proximate cause, Green
developed two corollaries to his "causal contribution" view of cause-in-
fact. First, Green distrusted all tests of causation. Thus, he banished the
but-for test from the domain of duty-risk analysis because it was an
evaluative, not scientific, test."6 Second, Green thought that at this stage
of the analysis all the court should try to do is link the defendant and
his behavior or his product with the injury; he flatly rejected the negligence-
causation and defect-causation tests espoused by the vast majority of courts
and commentators.2" Green felt that causal connection should be focused
not narrowly on the substandard aspect of defendant's conduct, but
broadly on the defendant's full pattern of behavior in its environmental
24. Malone, supra note 2, at 60. Lawyers' and jurists' use of unmodified "causation"
terms to solve issues of fairness between contending parties has an ancient heritage extend-
ing back to the classical era in Roman Law. See J. DAWSON, UNJUST ENRICHMENT: A COM-
PARATIVE ANALYSIS 44-47 (1951).
25. Smith, supra note 6, at 488.
26. L. GREEN, supra note 12, at 168-70; see also Thode, supra note 19, at 13 (but-for
test conceals policy choices behind facade of factual inquiry); Thode, The Indefensible Use
of the Hypothetical Case to Determine Cause in Fact, 46 TEx. L. REV. 423, 430 (1968)
(stating that counterfactual hypotheses are used by courts in conjunction with the but-for
test to resolve not factual but policy issues).
27. Compare Green, Strict Liability Under Sections 402A and 402B: A Decade of Litiga-
tion, 54 TEX. L. REV. 1185, 1197-1200, 1207-08 (1976); Green, supra note 2, at 550; Green
& Smith, supra note 19, at 1120-22; Thode, supra note 26, at 425; Thode, A Reply to
the Defense of the Use of the Hypothetical Case to Resolve the Causation Issue, 47 TEX.
L. REV. 1344, 1346-47, 1352 (1969) with Keeton, Products Liability-Inadequacy of Infor-
mation, 48 TEX. L. REV. 398, 413 (1970); McClellan, Strict Liability for Drug Induced In-
juries: An Excursion Through the Maze of Products Liability, Negligence and Absolute
Liability, 25 WAYNE L. REV. 1, 21 (1978); Twerski, The Many Faces of Misuse: An Inquiry
Into the Emerging Doctrine of Comparative Causation, 29 MERCER L. REV. 403, 409-10
(1978).
[I]t is necessary to prove not merely that the product caused the plaintiff's harm
but that the defect was the causative agent. In the normal case this is done by
applying the sina [sic] qua non or but-for test to the injury event. But-for the
defect would the injury have occurred?
Id. at 409 (footnote omitted).
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context." Indeed, Green so distrusted "causation" and its connotations
that, in the interest of clarifying the task at each stage of the analysis,
he excised the word "cause" from his phrasing of both the causal-relation
and scope-of-duty agendas.29
Wex Malone's Dissent from Green's Views on Cause-in-Fact
In his Stanford Law Review essay on cause-in-fact, Wex Malone
disagreed with Green's atomistic view of factual cause and both of Green's
causal corollaries. Although Wex Malone can generally be described as
a devotee of the duty-risk analysis,3" his views on the true nature of fac-
tual causation are radically different from Green's. While Leon Green,
Wayne Thode, and other duty-risk analysts have advocated an atomistic
policy-neutral causation-one which essentially reduces the causal issue
to a question of proper identification, i.e., does plaintiff have the correct
defendant in court-Wex Malone and others believe that factual causa-
tion entails policy considerations.' Professor Malone was aware of the
28. See, e.g., Green, The Importance of Identifying the Issue in Litigation, 42 TEx.
L. REV. 835, 836 (1964); infra text accompanying notes 58-60.
29. Dean Green originally phrased the factual causation inquiry as a pursuit of the
"appreciable or substantial factor" in the causal panorama. L. GREEN, supra note 12, at
135, 137. Later, perhaps influenced by his colleague and disciple Wayne Thode, he must
have become distrustful of the policy-colored "substantial factor" test (Professor Jeremiah
Smith had forged it as a test of proximate cause), for Green began using the phrase "causal
connection" to describe factual causation and phrased the causal inquiry, roughly, as whether
the defendant's whole conduct contributed in any way to plaintiff's harm. See, e.g., Green,
Duties, Risks, Causation Doctrines, 41 TEX. L. REV. 42, 44 (1962) [hereinafter cited as
Green, Duties]; Green, Identification of Issues in Negligence Cases, 26 Sw. L.J. 811, 811,
813-14 (1972) [hereinafter cited as Green, Identification]; Green, supra note 28, at 836; see
also Peczenik, Causation and Fault in Torts: How to Save the Lawyers from the Philosophers,
in LAW AND THE FUTURE OF SocIrETY 231, 237 n.23 (F. Hutley, E. Kamenka & A. Tay
eds. 1979) ("[Green's causal] thought evolved from the formula 'substantial factor' to a
more liberal formula, 'contributed to injury'."); Crowe, supra note 20, at 904. But Green
was so smitten with Jeremiah Smith's substantial-factor formula that it reappeared in some
of his later essays. See, e.g., Green, The Submission of Issues in Negligence Cases, 18 U.
Mi,,n L. REV. 30, 34 (1963); Green, supra note 27, at 1197; Green & Smith, supra note
19, at 1118.
30. See, e.g., Malone, Ruminations on Dixie Drive It Yourself Versus American Beverage
Company, 30 LA. L. REv. 363 (1970); Malone, Contributory Negligence, supra note 10,
at 91; see also Crowe, supra note 20, at 903 n.2; Johnson, supra note 3, at 341.
31. Compare Green, supra note 29, at 33; Landes & Posner, Causation in Tort Law:
An Economic Approach, 12 J. LEoAL STUD. 109, 110-11 (1983) (The requirement of cause-
in-fact is minimal if not superfluous because it is usually obvious and cannot be the ground
of decision where it is not obvious; the ground in those hard cases must be some public
policy, whether economic or some other.); Thode, supra note 19, at 2; Thode, supra note
26, at 424, 434 with Calabresi, Concerning Cause and the Law of Torts: An Essay for
Harry Kalven, Jr., 43 U. Cm. L. REv. 69, 87, 106-07 (1975) (discussing causal rules as
attuned to the advancement of the economic-efficiency goals of the common law); Hender-
son, Renewed Judicial Controversy over Defective Product Design: Toward the Preserva-
tion of an Emerging Consensus, 63 MINN. L. REv. 773, 778 (1979) (arguing that the con-
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problems in any comprehensive causal "test," but unlike Green, he was
not troubled by the evaluative overtones of either the but-for or the
substantial-factor test since he had a gestalt view of cause-in-fact.' 2
To be sure, Malone was aware that the but-for test33 is too frail a
reed to support factual causation in every case. The but-for test cannot
identify the cause of harm in two broad categories of cases, namely, those
involving omissions and multiple sufficient causes. Torts commentators
and courts generally recognize that the but-for test breaks down "in situa-
tions where there are two independent factors, each being sufficient to
produce the injury."'34 In these two areas, the determination of cause-in-
fact clearly involves normative policy choices; but it was Malone's insight
to realize that policy factors are no less involved in the cases where causal
tests appear to be working smoothly than in the cases where these tests
fail to work at all.
A common belief, however, is that policy considerations have no role
to play in the determination of cause-in-fact, "because no policy can be
strong enough to warrant the imposition of liability for loss to which
cepts of "unreasonably dangerous" and "cause in fact" largely overlap in manufacturing-
defect strict products liability cases); Kaye & Aickin, A Comment on Causal Apportion-
ment, 13 J. LEGAL STUD. 191 (1984); Malone, supra note 2, passim; Rizzo & Arnold, Causal
Apportionment in the Law of Torts: An Economic Theory, 80 COLUM. L. REv. 1399 (1980)
(a normative economics perspective on causation-based allocation of liability); Robinson,
Multiple Causation in Tort Law: Reflections on the DES Cases, 68 VA. L. REV. 713, 713-14,
713 n.l (1982); Shavell, An Analysis of Causation and the Scope of Liability in the Law
of Torts, 9 J. LEGAL STUD. 463 (1980) (positive economic analysis of the efficiency and
incentive effects of causal rules and tests in tort law).
32. For a brief but accurate overview of the gestalt perception of reality, see Miles,
Gestalt Theory, in 3 THE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHv 318 (P. Edwards ed. 1967) ("A
Gestalt is essentially an organized whole whose parts belong together, as opposed to being
simply juxtaposed or randomly distributed."). The writer wishes to point out that Wex
Malone did not use the adjective "gestalt" to describe his view of the nature of causality;
but this term, taken in its original technical sense, captures Malone's belief that in all but
the simplest cases factual cause and evaluation are one and the same phenomenon: fact
and policy, Malone believed, are inextricably involved one with the other in the determina-
tion of factual causation in every hard case and even in many, perhaps most, easy cases.
In short, whenever cause-in-fact is a disputed issue, its definition will be normative, not
positive. See Malone, supra note 2, at 64-66.
33. Causa sine qua non or but-for cause can be cast in either positive or negative form.
In its positive phrasing, it is often stated that the defendant is the cause of the plaintiff's
damages if the accident would not have occurred but for the negligence of the defendant.
In its negative phrasing, the test is used to determine what is not a factual cause of the
harm:'the defendant is not the casue-in-fact of the plaintiff's injury if the accident would
have nevertheless occurred absent the defendant's negligent conduct. See generally 2 F. HARPER
& F. JAwsaS, THE LAW OF TORTS § 20.2, at 1110 (1956); W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE
LAW OF TORTS § 41, at 238-40 (4th ed. 1971); Malone, supra note 2, at 64-68; Smith, Legal
Cause in Actions of Tort, 25 HARv. L. REV. 103, 109 (1911).
34. Strachan, The Scope and Application of the "But For" Causal Test, 33 MoD. L.
REV. 386, 391 (1970).
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the defendant's conduct has not in fact contributed." 3 Although this
maxim commands the general allegiance of even Wex Malone, he realized
that its application can be troublesome. For example, how much factual
connection and physical propinquity are enough to amount to legal cause-
in-fact? Thus, because policy factors are necessary even in the causal in-
quiry, to understand the nature and role of cause-in-fact in the tort milieu,
one must advert to the goals and purposes of tort law.
The Policy Objectives of Tort Law and the Cause-in-Fact Requirement
There are three generally recognized goals or guiding premises of tort
liability: (1) compensation and loss-spreading, (2) fairness between the par-
ties, and (3) deterrence of accident-producing behavior.36 Several com-
mentators have investigated whether the cause-in-fact requirement advances
any of these fundamental goals of tort law. The first of these, if restricted
to loss-spreading, is not advanced by a factual causation precept; as Guido
Calabresi has observed, loss-spreading aims exclusively to minimize the
individual burden of accident losses by spreading them among either society
at large or certain categories of persons, thereby diluting their impact.37
Since no positive correlation or necessary connection exists between the
causing of accidents and the ability to bear losses, a factual causation
prerequisite to liability is irrelevant to achieving the loss-spreading goal
of tort law.3"
35. J. FLamNo, supra note 11, at 170. See also Peaslee, Multiple Causation and Damage,
47 HARv. L. REV. 1127, 1130 (1934) (conduct not causal in fact cannot be causal in law).
36. See, e.g., Chapman, Ethical Issues in the Law of Tort, 20 U.W. ONTARIO L. REv.
1, 2 (1982); Robinson, supra note 31, at 736.
37. The theory of risk distribution is definitively expounded in G. CALABREsI, THE COSTS
OF ACCIDENTS 39-67 (1970). See also P. ATrYAH, ACCIDENTS, COMPENSATION AND THE LAW
540-49 (3d ed. 1980) (spreading accident costs prevents placing crushing financial burdens
on individual persons).
38. See Calabresi, supra note 31, at 73-74.
Finally, it is said that the expansion of products liability works to "[spread]
throughout society . . . the cost of compensating [accident victims]" .... This
"spreading" argument is so powerful that it can explain away . . . all of tort
law. If redistribution is desired there is no reason why the law should retain the
requirements of causation and product defect; to the extent that any defendant
can rely upon those requirements to defeat a plaintiff's cause of action, this
"policy" of tort law will be defeated.
Epstein, Products Liability: The Search for the Middle Ground, 56 N.C.L. REv. 643, 659
(1978) (footnote omitted) (quoting Price v. Shell Oil Co., 2 Cal. 3d 245, 251, 466 P.2d
722, 726, 85 Cal. Rptr. 178, 182 (1970)).
[I]f compensation by "spreading the risk" is the main objective [of strict liability
in design-defect cases], the theory would be equally valid in justifying compensa-
tion for all injuries caused by all products even if they were not defective. This
is because the manufacturer is the superior risk bearer regardless of the defec-
tiveness of its.product. Why, then, consider it as a selective rationale for defec-
tive products only?
Hiilsen, Design Liability and State of the Art: The United States and Europe at a Crossroads,
55 ST. JOHN'S L. REv. 450, 483 (1981) (footnote omitted).
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At first blush, "fairness" appears to dictate causal connection as a
prerequisite to liability. But in fact, it is the requirement of causal con-
nection as a guarantee of "fairness" that creates the major obstacle to
recovery in modern toxic tort cases, as exemplified by the asbestosis and
DES cases: the plaintiffs could not establish as more probable than not
that any particular manufacturer marketed the item that produced the
disease.39 One might question whether "fairness between the parties" truly
requires the establishment of causal connection in such cases;40 in other
areas of law, the mere creation of hazard is sufficient for responsibility.
In the criminal context, it is considered fair to impose liability
for some crimes-for instance, reckless driving or attempted
crimes-even though no specific harm results. Similarly, fairness
in the civil context seems to require only that a defendant's liability
be related to his conduct, and that liability . . . be roughly pro-
portional to the seriousness of the risks that he has created.
• .. From the standpoint of fairness, the critical point is the crea-
39. In an earlier era of simpler torts, the lawyer's task of targeting and identifying
the defendant did not often present the sort of difficulties now common in radiation and
toxic torts. See Gelpe & Tarlock, The Uses of Scientoic Information in Environmental Deci-
sionmaking, 48 S. CAL. L. REv. 371, 404-07 (1974) (general overview of how scientific uncer-
tainties may affect proof of causal connection); Rosenberg, The Causal Connection in Mass
Exposure Cases: A "Public Law" Vision of the Tort System, 97 HARV. L. REV. 849 (1984);
Comment, Causation in Acid Rain Litigation: Facilitating Proof with Joint Liability Theories,
1983 B.Y.U. L. REV. 657; Comment, Proof of Causation in a Private Action for Acid
Rain Damage, 36 ME. L. REV. 117 (1984); Note, Pursuing a Cause of Action in Hazardous
Waste Pollution Cases, 29 BUFFALO L. REV. 533, 540-43 (1980); Note, Proving Causation
in Toxic Torts, 11 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1299 (1983); Note, An Analysis of Common Law
and Statutory Remedies for Hazardous Waste Injuries, 12 RUTGERS L.J. 117, 138-45 (1980);
Note, Establishing Causation in Chemical Exposure Cases: The Precursor Symptoms Theory,
35 RUTGERS L. REV. 163 (1982); Note, Nuclear Power and the Price-Anderson Act: Promo-
tion over Public Protection, 30 STAN. L. REV. 393, 420-22 (1978) (examining the problems
of establishing scientific causation in radiation disease cases); Note, Tort Actions for Cancer:
Deterrence, Compensation, and Environmental Carcinogenesis, 90 YALE L.J. 840, 853-62
(1981).
For the same reasons that it has become so difficult to prove factual causation in these
toxicity and pollution cases, it has likewise become more difficult to identify both the defen-
dants, see Robinson, supra note 31, passim (examining the problem of indeterminate defen-
dants in Sindell v. Abbott Laboratories, 26 Cal. 3d 588, 607 P.2d 924, 163 Cal. Rptr.
132, cert. denied, 449 U.S. 912 (1980)), and also the plaintiffs, see Delgado, Beyond Sindell:
Relaxation of Cause-In-Fact Rules for Indeterminate Plaintiffs, 70 CALF. L. REV. 881, 881-83
(1982) (expounding the reverse-Sindell scenario of indeterminate plaintiffs, e.g., those who
get cancer but do not know whether it developed "naturally" or was caused by toxic waste
pollution; in scientific terms the etiology of the disease may be unclear since the disease
may also occur in a control environment that is free of the toxic contaminant). For an
interesting analysis of Sindell and other problematic causation cases by an academic
philosopher, see Thomson, Remarks on Causation and Liability, 13 PHIn. & PUB. AFFAIRS
101 (1984).
40. Robinson, supra note 31, at 739.
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tion of a risk that society deems to be unreasonable, not whether
anyone was injured by it.4 1
For the same reasons, the deterrence goal of tort law yields a similarly
unsatisfactory justification of the cause-in-fact requirement. "To deter only
unnecessarily risky behavior, the law [need only] require a causal link be-
tween the defendant's behavior and the risk that it seeks to deter. It is
not necessary, [therefore], that there be a link between the defendant's
risky conduct and a particular victim's injury."" 2 Hence, a strict adherence
to orthodox cause-in-fact rules would result in underdeterrence of toxic-
substances torts,43 and the rules cannot therefore be explained as con-
ducive to optimal deterrence.
There is, however, a neglected principle of justice that can explain
the requirement of a causal nexus in every tort action. As a number of
legal philosophers have observed: "[A]spects of the retributive theory [of
tort liability] seem to loom large in explaining the legal concern for
cause-in-fact." '4 4 Hence, even though deterrence and loss-spreading can-
not logically justify the cause-in-fact requirement, since notions of
retributive justice are usually included within the idea of "fairness," this
commonly avowed goal of tort law can be used to explain the causal
precept.4" The author of a recent essay on the origins of the factual cause
imperative was greatly influenced in his opinions on the matter by Holmes,
Pound, and Malone. Having relied greatly on Holmes's history of the
evolution of legal sanctions, the writer concluded that
the cause in fact requirement can be traced to the desire for
41. Id. (footnotes omitted). See also Weinrib, A Step Forward in Factual Causation,
38 MoD. L. REv. 518, 523-29 (1975).
42. Robinson, supra note 31, at 740 (emphasis added) (footnote omitted).
43. Id. But see Calabresi, supra note 31, at 85-87 (asserting that cause-in-fact advances
the deterrence goal of tort law by creating economic incentives for persons to avoid socially
reprobated activities). But of course if cause-in-fact is to be rationalized on deterrence grounds,
the inquiry should be whether cause-in-fact engenders or hinders optimal deterrence. See
also Coleman, The Morality of Strict Tort Liability, 18 WM. & MARY L. REV. 259, 262-63
(1976) (demonstrating that causal and fault-based rules are neither mandated nor supported
by risk-spreading and deterrence rationales of tort law).
44. Chapman, supra note 36, at 6; see infra note 46 and accompanying text. Moreover,
the modern prominence of various species of strict-liability torts suggests that cause-in-fact
should become even more important as the first essential link in the chain of civil culp-
ability. See F. LAWSON, NEGLIGENCE IN THE CivIL LAW 50 (1950) ("The development of
strict liability has thrown much more weight than formerly on the element of causation,
which, as we have seen, is hard, and perhaps ultimately impossible, to divorce entirely from
fault.").
45. That retributive justice has not more often been used to explain and justify sundry
concepts in criminal and civil law is probably due to the fact that modern Western law
has denied the psychological "givenness" of revenge in its attempts to anathematize retribu-
tion as a legitimate goal of "civilized" legal systems. See generally S. JACOBY, WILD JUSTICE:
THE EVOLUTION OF REVENGE (1983).
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vengeance. This desire for vengeance resulted in the need to iden-
tify the person committing the harmful act or possessing the harm-
ful object. Responsibility for the injury was associated with causa-
tion, both because the object itself was blamed for the harm and
because the owner had control over the object doing the harm.
Without these relationships, vengeance would not come about and
liability would not attach."
Indeed, at bottom there may be no real difference between civil com-
pensation and retribution. One commentator has argued that for a pay-
ment to count as compensation it must conform to "the intrinsic retributive
component of sanctions." 7 His thesis is that civil compensation aims to
rectify the moral imbalance between tortfeasor and victim caused by the
injury-event. Thus, if a Navajo village is destroyed by a brush fire and
charitable persons in Phoenix send money to reduce the villagers' suffer-
ing, such contributions cannot qualify as compen*sation. "We can help
the victims with our funds, but as a conceptual matter, we do not com-
pensate them. Had an arsonist set the fire and been required to pay for
the damage, however, [his] payments would constitute compensation.""'
In tort law, then, compensatory and retributive justice are coextensive.
Therefore, if the first listed goal of tort law is restricted to "compensa-
tion" rather than "loss spreading," and if the law focuses not on the
bare fact of payment but on who should be required to pay and why,
then the causal requirement will advance compensation to the precise ex-
tent that it satisfies retribution.
46. Zwier, "Cause In Fact" in Tort Law-A Philosophical and Historical Examina-
tion, 31 DE PAUL L. REV. 769, 784 (1982). Leon Green also noted the "deep sense of
early common law morality that one who hurts another should compensate him" and that
this conviction tended "to tilt judgment in favor of the [plaintiff]." Green, Foreseeability
in Negligence Law, 61 COLUM. L. REV. 1401, 1412 (1961). Further evidence for the central
position of retribution in our legal system can be found in a recent book on the evolution
of revenge. See S. JACOBY, supra note 45, passim. The author's collected evidence and
argumentation suggest that retribution is more than consistent with a just society's rightful
aims-it is demanded by them; for a natural moral instinct for revenge is one element of
mankind's ideal of justice. And this instinct is not confined to the criminal law. Civil damages
are often sought (and granted) as punishment of some sort. One of the commonest motives
for filing a civil suit is to achieve retribution, to make the defendant "pay" in much the
same sense that a crime victim wants the offender to "pay." Id. at 5-6, 11.
47. Fletcher, Punishment and Compensation, 14 CREIGHTON L. REV. 691, 692 (1981).
48. Id. at 699. See also S. JACOBY, supra note 45, at 350. For support, from the fields
of comparative law and legal history, of Professor Fletcher's thesis that in a tort context
compensation and retribution are opposite sides of the same coin, see D. DAUBE, STUDIES
IN BIBLICAL LAW 102-10, 114-16, 128 (1947); T. ELIAS, THE NATURE OF AFRICAN CUSTOMARY
LAW 135, 155-61 (1956); MacCormack, Revenge and Compensation in Early Law, 21 AM.
J. CoMP. L. 69, 75, 80-81 (1973); McLaren, The Origins of Tortious Liability: Insights
from Contemporary Tribal Societies, 25 U. TORONTO L.J. 42, 52-60 (1975); Malone, Rumina-
tions on Fault, supra note 10, at 1-5. Louisiana Civil Code article 2321 contains a vestigial
remnant of the ancient notion of civil retribution through noxal surrender. See id. at 4-5,
4 n.12.
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The Logical and Legal Fallacies of the But-For Test and
"What If" Hypotheses
The principle of retributive justice also illuminates the infirmities of
the but-for test and explains why the test's results seem so unsatisfactory
in the hard cases, i.e., those involving omissions or multiple sufficient
causes. In cases of concurrent or successive individually sufficient causes,' 9
the but-for test does not comport with our expectations; for if the con-
duct of each co-defendant is sufficient to cause the harm, the but-for
test, strictly applied, would exonerate each wrongdoer. Clearly, to permit
the multiple defendants to escape liability by endlessly passing the hot-
potato of sufficient cause back and forth between them would offend
the principle of retribution."0
For like reasons, the same unsatisfactory results occur when the but-
for test is applied to cases involving omissions. Indeed, these cases pro-
vide the classic medium for the but-for test, and it is here that the test's
innate shortcomings are magnified. Professor Wayne Thode was the most
thorough critic of the fanciful causation that results from the "pyramiding
of probabilities"'" necessary to the use of the but-for test in negligent-
omission cases. He discerned the similarity, if not identity, of using
counterfactual hypotheses to determine cause-in-fact in "failure to act"
cases and using the but-for test 2 in "negligent act" cases.
49. The textbook example is provided by Cook v. Minneapolis, St. P. & S. Ste. M.
Ry., 98 Wis. 624, 642, 74 N.W. 561, 566 (1898) where two fires, one negligently set by
the defendant and the other of innocent origin, merged to burn down the plaintiff's house.
Either fire, unjoined by the other, could have destroyed the house. See Carpenter, Concur-.
rent Causation, 83 U. PA. L. REv. 941, 948 (1935); Strachan, supra note 34, at 391.
50. Cf. P. ATIYAH, supra note 37, at 119 ("absurd" to let both defendants escape
liability). Glanville Williams noted the breakdown of the but-for test in cases of successive
or concurrent sufficient causes (in his parlance, "cumulative causation") and stated that
"[s]ituations of this type present a problem of legal policy." Williams, Causation in the
Law, 1961 CAMrntmE L.J. 62, 75. For the argument that by exculpating independent, causally
sufficient wrongdoers the but-for test gives an unjustified windfall to tortfeasors, see Eaton,
Causation in Constitutional Torts, 67 IOWA L. REv. 443, 460-61 (1982).
51. For the dangers of error in the jury's "pyramiding probabilities" in order to "reach
its decision by assuming the certainty of each event in a chain of disputed events," see
Weinstein, Twerski, Piehler & Donaher, Product Liability: An Interaction of Law and
Technology, 12 DuQ. L. REV. 425, 452 n.24 (1974).
52. See Grady, Proximate Cause and the Law of Negligence, 69 IOWA L. REv. 363,
391-93 (1984).
[C]ause-in-fact analysis is a hypothetical reconstruction of how events would have
turned out if something would have been different. The something that is assumed
to be different is "no negligence." In cause-in-fact analysis, the court asks "what
if?$" If there had been no negligence would the accident have happened anyway?
If the accident would have happened anyway, even if there had been no negligence,
there is no cause in fact. On the other hand, if the accident would not have
occurred but for the negligence, there is cause in fact. In short, cause-in-fact analysis
is both hypothetical and counterfactual analysis.
Id. at 392 (emphasis added) (footnote omitted).
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[Tihe hypothetical-case test . . . is merely a more sophisticated
version of the "but for" or sine qua non test . . . . "But for"
has all of the drawbacks and the same lack of rationality as a
determinant of cause in fact as does the hypothetical case test-it
focuses the jury's attention on speculation about what might have
happened rather than on the cause in fact problem of "what
happened.""
Thode also suggested the grave practical consequences of "hypothetical"
but-for causation for the plaintiff's prima facie case when he tersely
observed: "Even if otherwise an acceptable test, the production of proof
to establish a negative in a fictional situation is obviously a very onerous
burden.'"" Perhaps Wex Malone was too sanguine, then, when he main-
tained that the but-for test satisfied the common man's sense of
causation." For most jurors, such a pseudo-scientific test must stand as
a prominent example of esoteric expertise, and the idea that the ordinary
man measures claims of everyday causation by a rigid but-for test is
unrealistic. The ordinary man asks about what actually happened, while
the but-for test asks what would have happened had reality been
otherwise. 6
If the standard for comparison is the ordinary person's implicit sense
of causation, Green arguably has a more realistic theory of legal cause-
in-fact than Malone, for Green distrusts the but-for test: "Tests of this
character have the same vice as any 'if,' or any analogy. They take the
eye off the ball."" Moreover, numerous philosophers have also noted
the difficulties involved in finding actual, scientific cause based on counter-
factual causation. Indeed, one logician whose specialty was the study of
53. Thode, supra note 26, at 431. Professor Thode's mentor had made the same point
almost forty years earlier.
In no case does [the but-for test] present the issue to be determined. It sends
the inquirer back to discover if the result could have happened without the defen-
dant's participation. The assumption is that if the result would have happened
anyhow, then the defendant is not a cause. Such an inquiry at this point is vicious
from two aspects: (1) it presents an inquiry impossible of determination; the case
is not what might have happened but what has happened; (2) the inquiry while
stated in what seems to be terms of cause is in fact whether the defendant should
be held responsible.
Green, supra note 21, at 605 (footnote omitted).
54. Thode, supra note 26, at 426 n.13. "The test of factual in the sense of but-for
causation . . . is not an easy one to apply, because it involves speculation." Williams,
supra note 50, at 69. See also Carpenter, supra note 49, at 948 (question of cause-in-fact
should not be "what would have occurred" but "what did occur").
55. Malone, supra note 2, at 67.
56. See Epstein, A Theory of Strict Liability, 2 J. LEGAL STUD. 151, 160 (1973).
57. Green, supra note 2, at 556. Green's criticism of the but-for/hypothetical cause
test as taking your eye off the ball means that the test "takes the focus off the defendant's
conduct and goes abroad for other causes." Id. at 557. See also Green, Duties, supra note
29, at 68.
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counterfactual causes concluded somberly that their validation entails "an
infinite regressus or a circle . . . . In other words to establish any counter-
factual, it seems that we first have to determine the truth of another.
If so, we can never explain a counterfactual except in terms of others,
so that the problem of counterfactuals must remain unsolved." '" This
passage expresses, in philosophical language, the lawyer's concern about
the lack of a realistic causal description in the "pyramiding of possibilities"
that takes place when the but-for test is used.
Given the logical and legal infirmities in the use of counterfactual
hypotheses and the but-for test to "prove" cause-in-fact, it is surprising
that courts have continued to employ the test for as long as they have.
It is certainly not because commentators have failed to call the problems
to the courts' attention.' Perhaps their penchant for the device is
grounded, as Green and Thode suggested, in its utility as a means of
delimiting liability on the basis of ostensibly neutral causal language,
thereby circumventing the difficult but essential scope-of-duty analysis.
Rather than marshaling the many social policy factors that should be con-
sidered in setting the ambit of potential liability, the courts have restricted
the inquiry by employing the one factor of but-for causation to dispose
of the case. 6 0
Malone's Gestalt Theory of Cause-in-Fact
As mentioned earlier, Professor Malone is disturbed by neither the
but-for nor the substantial-factor test. His equanimity is probably a result
of his gestalt theory of causation. Professor Malone succinctly stated his
view of the unitary nature of causation in the introduction to his seminal
study of cause-in-fact.
I find that even with reference to this issue of simple cause [i.e.,
cause in fact] the mysterious relationship between policy and fact
58. N. GOODMAN, FACT, FICTION, AND FORECAST 16 (4th ed. 1983). See also Rescher,
Belief-Contravening Suppositions and the Problem of Contrary-To-Fact Conditionals, in
CAUSATION AND CONDITIONALS 156 (E. Sosa ed. 1975).
59. In addition to the critiques by Green and Thode, several other commentators have
exposed the shortcomings of hypothetical/but-for causation. See, e.g., Cole, Windfall and
Probability: A Study of "Cause" in Negligence Law-Part II, Factual Uncertainty and Com-
petitive Fairness, 52 CALIF. L. REv. 764, 790 (1964); Twerski, Weinstein, Donaher & Piehler,
The Use and Abuse of Warnings in Products Liability-Design Defect Litigation Comes
of Age, 61 CORNELL L. REV. 495, 532-33 (1976) (observing that the "inherent unreliability
of untested theoretical propositions" undermines the integrity of the judicial process).
[I]n our saner moments, we ought to be ready to admit that cause-in-fact is one
of the most intractable items to prove in a law suit .... The use of the hypothetical
but-for to. prove causation presumes that the process of mental "instant replay"
of the accident is a valid fact-finding endeavor. More than one reputable scholar
has taken issue with that thesis.
Twerski, supra note 27, at 413 (footnote omitted).
60. See Thode, supra note 26, at 427, 430; see also Cole, supra note 59, at 767-68.
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is likely to be in the foreground. In this Article it will be
demonstrated that policy may often be a factor when the issue
of cause-in-fact is presented sharply for decision, much as it is
when questions of-proximate cause are before the court.'
Malone, unlike Green, was simply not disturbed about the use of causal
tests that are at base evaluative. Because he recognized (and welcomed)
the jury's inclination to employ "policy" or "justice" sentiments when
deciding causal relation questions, he expressed confidence in both the
but-for test 3 and the substantial-factor test."
For these same reasons, Malone was not disposed to heed Green's
fervent insistence that factual cause should not try to link the plaintiff's
damages to the defendant's negligence or to the product's defect, but
should merely try to link the hurt to the defendant's conduct or product
as a whole. Green had two reasons for believing that the causal inquiry
should simply be "Did this defendant's total conduct or undertaking in
any way contribute to plaintiff's injury?"" First, this test was a natural
consequence of absolute bifurcation. Since in Green's view there should
be absolutely no "responsibility" concerns tinting the neutral cause-in-
fact issue, Green claimed the causal inquiry should not focus on the
liability-tinged aspect of the defendant's conduct; rather, the law should
look to defendant's full behavioral pattern as the causative agent." Sec-
ond, Green leveled against the negligence-causation doctrine his strictures
against hypothetical cause; in applying the negligence-causation rule, he
argued, one was confronted with the absurdity of having "nothing" cause
"something." 6
"
61. Malone, supra note 2, at 61.
62. See supra note 32 and accompanying text; see also L. GREEN, supra note 12, at
168-70; Thode, supra note 19, at 13. For Professor Malone's argument that the but-for
test is "a statement of legal policy," see Malone, supra note 2, at 66. Cf. Probert, supra
note 6, at 373 (treating the but-for test and the negligence-causation rule as value-freighted
doctrines).
63. Malone, supra note 2, at 67.
64. Id. at 91; cf. Thode, supra note 26, at 430 (noting that in actual litigation a jury
is likely to find a causal connection in appropriate cases, e.g., those involving disasters
or highly blameworthy defendants, even when charged that defendant's negligence must be
the "but-for" cause of the harm). Therefore, since the jury will for reasons of "ethical
policy" or "fairness" find a causal link in spite of the but-for test, and since the judge
can direct a verdict or render a judgment notwithstanding the verdict or a summary judg-
ment, should not the law employ a cause-in-fact test that satisfies the jury's ethical instincts
and their quotidian sense of causation? This test would, of course, be simple causal connec-
tion of the Green-Thode variety, but unlike theirs, it should, as Malone maintains, be causal
connection colored by tones of responsibility.
65. See, e.g., Green, Indentification, supra note 29, at 814; Green, The Importance
of Identifying the Issue in Litigation, 42 TEX. L. REV. 835, 836 (1964); see also Crowe,
supra note 20, at 904; see supra text accompanying notes 26-27.
66. See, e.g., Green, Identification, supra note 29, at 813-14.
67. See, e.g., Green & Smith, supra note 19, at 1119-20 ("Negligence is only a legal
concept and cannot cause anything. Only affirmative conduct can cause." (footnote omitted));
see also Green, supra note 2, at 551.
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Malone's Support of the Orthodox Negligence-Causation Rule
Because Professor Malone believed that the complete "atomization"
of proximate cause was a vain psychological hope, 68 he adhered to the
orthodox negligence-causation test of causal link 69 rather than to Green's
"holistic" view of the causative agent.7" Malone clearly holds the high
ground in this skirmish, if for no other reasons than administrative effi-
ciency and judicial economy. As many scholars have observed, the absence
of cause-in-fact ends the plaintiff's case without any further deliberation
on duty, breach, or damages.7" Thus, economy in the use of judicial
resources dictates that the causal focus fall upon the negligent conduct
or the defective feature of the product; the negligence-causation rule is,
as it were, a requirement of the consolidation of all claims applied inter-
nally to the case itself.7" To do later what could be done at the threshhold
of the case would be wasteful and inane.
In a passage examining proximate cause in strict products liability,
Professor William Crowe, a disciple of Green's, unwittingly indicated the
inefficiencies and confusions that can be created by using Green's holistic
view of the causative agent rather than the defect/negligence-causation
rule endorsed by Wex Malone.
Even if a given defect is deemed dangerous, it is not actionable
unless it is a "proximate cause" of the injury complained. This
writer uses the term "proximate cause" with some reluctance. It
can be more accurately stated that the duty of a manufacturer
not to produce a product that is unreasonably dangerously defec-
tive does not encompass the risk of a harm occurring which would
have occurred even if the product had not been defective ...
Stated [in terms of the duty-risk analysis], it can be said that the
68. See Malone, supra note 2, at 66-67.
69. See Malone, supra note 30, at 370.
70. Green had an "atomistic" view of cause-in-fact in that he believed the causal issue
should be absolutely divorced from all evaluative and normative questions. On the other
hand, Green took a "holistic" view of the causative agent in that he rejected the negligence-
causation doctrine and held instead that the defendant's full behavioral pattern, not just
the substandard piece of it, should be regarded as the factual cause of the harm. See supra
text accompanying notes 17-21, 27-28, 31.
71. See, e.g., Williams, supra note 50, at 64. "[T]he causation issue can short-circuit
a lawsuit at the very outset. It is thus an issue that deserves the attention of counsel and
experts at the earliest stages of litigation." A. WEINSTEIN, A. TWERSKI, H. PIEHLER & W.
DONAHER, PRODUCTS LLABrLrY AND THE REASONABLY SAFE PRODUCT: A GUADE FOR MANAGE-
MENT, DESIGN, AND MARKETING 79 (1978).
72. Cf. P. Atiyah, supra note 37, at 120 ("There does seem to be a rational basis
for [the but-for] approach, namely that a person should not be able to build his entire
cause of action on a possibility, but only on a reasonable probability. This discourages
speculative actions."); cf. Weinrib, supra note 41, at 518-19 ("Since cause in fact can deter-
mine innocence but not liability, it functions as a test of exclusion, allowing a court to
weed out defendants without having to decide whether their conduct was legally culpable.").
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duty not to manufacture an automobile with a defective steering
mechanism does not encompass the risk of a harm occurring on
an occasion when the steering mechanism did function properly.73
To satisfy causal connection, Dean Green and Professor Crowe would
ask simply whether the defendant's total product (the car) had anything
to do with the accident,7" and since the accident posited by Crowe was
73. Crowe, Products Liability Law-A Brief Reflection on Legal Analysis and an Aspect
of the Concept of Defect, 34 MERCER L. REv. 955, 963 (1983) (footnotes omitted). For
a general discussion of cause in fact in products liability, see Molloy & Thomas, Causation
Problems in Design Defect Litigation, 3 LEoAL NOTES & VIEWPOINTS Q. 35 (1983).
74. By extrapolation from what Leon Green wrote about causal relation in negligence
law, the proposition emerges that judges and lawyers should not restrict their gaze to the
defect in the product when treating the cause-in-fact issue in strict products liability cases.
"Legal defect" in a strict products liability action is analogous to "negligent acts or omis-
sions" in a negligence case; each is a specific instance, under different standards of lia-
bility, of behavior that is alleged to fall below the norms set by law. Thus the Greenian
position on cause-in-fact in products cases would be that the law should not narrowly focus
on the defective or flawed aspect of the product; rather, it should suffice for causal connec-
tion that the trier-of-fact concentrate on the whole product, the item itself, as the cause-in-
fact of the hurt.
Fortunately, we do not have to surmise that Green would support these ideas about
causation in strict products liability, for one of his last essays dealt with litigation involving
section 402A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts. See Green, supra note 27. After declar-
ing that "the false issue of 'defect-causation' is a procedural cancer," id. at 1187 n.5, Green
affirmed his position on cause-in-fact by stating: "Whether . . . the seller's placing the
product in the stream of trade did contribute substantially to the consumer's injury . .
. is the only legitimate cause issue." Id. at 1199. Green characteristically adhered to his
holistic view of causation: He focused not on any flaw or defect in the product but on
the availability of the product itself for use by consumers. But as noted in the text, ad-
ministrative efficiency and the screening purposes of the cause-in-fact requirement militate
against Green's holistic approach. Why not cull unmeritorious claims as soon as possible,
here at the gateway causal inquiry, rather than later at the scope-of-duty stage? See supra
text accompanying notes 71-73; see also J. FLEMING, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE LAW OF
TORTS 109 (1967) (referring to the cause-in-fact issue as "[tihe first screening of all claims").
Before the recent inclusion, through article 1811, of a motion for judgment notwithstanding
the verdict in the Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure, there was, as Professor Alston Johnson
observed, a special problem for Louisiana courts in using the Greenian formulation of cause-
in-fact, since Louisiana's procedural law did not, before 1983, provide for "judgment not-
withstanding the verdict." Therefore, even though the pre-1983 defendant automobile manufac-
turer in Crowe's example could have been exonerated in Louisiana by a court's declaring
that "the law will not hold him liable" because the steering mechanism was not defective,
it was nevertheless most appropriate before 1983 to "question whether in Louisiana, where
we lack the necessary tools to decide the [causal] question at a later stage, we are not better
off relieving the [automobile] manufacturer at the earlier [cause-in-fact] stage." 2 A. JOHNsON,
LOUISIANA JURY INSTRUCTIONs-Crvm 53 (1980). Even though article 1811 has removed some
of the force from Professor Johnson's observation, his basic point-that the courts should
not procrastinate the nonsuiting of plaintiffs with tenuous causal claims-should still be
heeded in order to advance both administrative efficiency and justness of decision; for there
is likely to be some judicial reluctance to grant motions for judgment notwithstanding the
verdict on lack of cause-in-fact grounds because of the understandable feeling that the causal
issue, once given to the jury, should not be subject to routine reexamination and second-
guessing by the judge.
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a car wreck, it would be virtually impossible, using Green's holistic causal
test, for the judge to nonsuit the plaintiff for want of cause-in-fact. In
such cases, the standard defect-causation approach would avoid the ab-
surdity of bringing the manufacturer of an allegedly defective product
to bar when in fact the supposedly defective feature functioned properly
or safely and therefore could not have been the cause-in-fact of the
accident." To follow Professor Crowe's advice and dispose of such ob-
vious "lack of cause-in-fact" cases on the basis of risk exclusion (or no
proximate cause) would be to do later what could more logically and ef-
ficiently be done sooner-namely, to nonsuit the plaintiff on the cause-
in-fact issue (before even considering the scope of duty) by fixing upon
the substandard aspect of the product (the flaw) as the causative agent. 16
One further objection by Green to the negligence-causation rule re-
mains to be addressed-namely, that it is subject to the same problems
of speculation as the but-for/hypothetical cause test because it entails a
"nothing" (disembodied legal concepts such as negligence and legal defect)
causing "something" (physical damage or injury). This objection can be
75. If the law should for reasons of, say, deterrence want to extend the duty to cover
harms that arise whenever a defective product occasions harm, even when the defective
aspect of the product is not the efficient cause-in-fact of the harm-if the law should decide
to do this, it should not, for clarity's sake if no other, pretend that traditional cause-in-fact
has been established. The courts should instead openly declare that a special duty has been
devised in order to advance some desired social policy, such as deterrence or loss-spreading.
See A. JoHNsoN, supra note 74, at 52-53. Clearly, liability in such a "lack of cause-in-fact"
case could not be justified on the basis of retributive justice-which as explained earlier
constitutes the fundamental moral concern of the cause-in-fact requirement-because the
.injury-event in such a case would be an "accident" in the purest sense of the word.
76. A seller is strictly liable only if a substandard aspect of his product caused the
harm at issue. See Weber v. Fidelity & Casualty Ins. Co., 259 La. 599, 603, 250 So. 2d
754, 755 (1971); RESTATEMENT (SECoND) OF TORTS § 402A(l) (1965); Twerski, supra note
27, at 409 (quoted supra note 27); see also id. at 419.
In Louisiana the trial judge could in the appropriate case nonsuit a plaintiff for lack
of cause-in-fact either by directing a verdict under articles 1672(B) or 1810 of the Louisiana
Code of Civil Procedure or by giving a judgment notwithstanding the verdict under article
1811. For a case involving facts very similar to those posited by Crowe and in which the
New Jersey Supreme Court upheld a verdict for defendant directed by the trial judge on
the ground that no causal nexus had been shown between the defendant (and his control
of the product) and the accident, see Scanlon v. General Motors Corp., 65 N.J. 582, 598-601,
326 A.2d 673, 681-83 (1974). This case demonstrates the administratively efficient method
of handling such cases. Products liability cases involving modifications or tampering by
the plaintiff can, and often should be, decided not on grounds of "foreseeable misuse"
but on the basis of no factual causation. In many such cases the original product contained
no defect; the purchaser's jury-rigging of the item could then be regarded as the true cause-
in-fact of the accident. Cf. Hanlon v. Cyril Bath Co., 541 F.2d 343 (3d Cir. 1975) (plain-
tiff's employer replaced manufacturer's safety switch with a sensitive, easily activated starter;
this modified starter constituted a substantial change in the product); Rios v. Niagara Mach.
& Tool Works, 59 Ill. 2d 79, 319 N.E.2d 232 (1974) (safety device attached by purchaser
to the drill press corrected any preexistent design defects in the press; purchaser's own safety
device malfunctioned thereby permitting the occurrence of plaintiff's injury).
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overcome by avoiding conclusory terms of law in phrasing the causal issue,
recasting it instead in liability-neutral terms such as "allegedly substan-
dard conduct" or "allegedly substandard aspect of the product." This
linguistic substitution scotches Green's objection that incorporeal concepts
cannot physically cause anything, for now a physical aspect of the prod-
uct or some feature of human conduct is treated as the antecedent causative
agent, not a legal conclusion such as "negligence" or "legal defect.""
Modern Scholarship on the Unity of Fact and Value
In sum, then, Wex Malone's gestalt account of cause-in-fact is more
efficient, more realistic, and more consonant with retributive justice than
Leon Green's atomistic theory. Moreover, if any further support were
needed, Professor Malone has received it in abundance from both
philosophers and lawyers. A philosophical essay by the late John Miller
strongly supports Malone's gestalt theory. 8 Professor Miller, like Malone,
reminded us that the natural, objective factual order occurs in consequence
of a human will or demand, or it does not occur at all. The "paradox
of cause" is that in a world that contained only factual or natural causa-
tion, natural cause could not be disclosed." Subjective purpose and ob-
jective nature, Miller argued, are mutually implicative; their relation, in
a word, is dialectical: "To assert cause as a property of an absolutely
objective and impersonal region is not a dogmatism; it is nonsense.'''"
As Miller's study indicates, a natural consequence of a gestalt view of
cause is that there is not one type of factual causation but many, each
shaped and defined by the purpose or goal of the causal inquiry." Malone
77. But see Cole, Windfall and Probability: A Study of "Cause" in Negligence Law-
Part I, Uses of Causal Language, 52 CALIF. L. REV. 459, 505 n.133 (1964) ("It is one
thing to say that 'conduct' is a 'cause in fact.' But in what sense does one say 'negligence'
or an 'aspect' is a 'cause in fact' of injury?" (emphasis added)).
78. See J. MILLER, THE PARADOX OF CAUSE AND OTHER ESSAYS 11-18 (1978).
79. Id. at 16.
80. Id. at 18. An English lawyer-jurisprudent also supports Malone (and Miller) on
the evaluative nature of causation. "The plain man, when confronted with a causal prob-
lem, does not distinguish between the question of factual causation and that of responsi-
bility; he gives a single answer, yes or no, which is intended to resolve both questions."
Williams, supra note 50, at 69. See also J. FEINBERG, DOING & DESERVING ch. 8 (1970)
(demonstrating the close, at times inseparable, relationship of "cause" and "fault"). And
a torts scholar associated with the law-and-economics school has made causation the linch-
pin of his comprehensive theory of tort liability because in his view it efficiently and ac-
curately joins damage to responsibility.
[T~he analysis of causation is the tool which, prima facie, fastens responsibility
upon the defendant. Indeed for most persons, the difficult question is often not
whether these causal assertions create the presumption [of liability], but whether
there are in fact any means to distinguish between causation and responsibility,
so close is the connection between what a man does and what he is answerable for.
Epstein, supra note 56, at 169.
81. A number of philosophers had earlier made important contributions to the develop-
ment and promulgation of this theory of causation. See, e.g., M. COHEN & E. NAGEL,
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argued this thesis so persuasively82 that his essay has become authoritative
on the point, and numerous legal scholars now agree with him.83
In an illuminating essay on the rhetoric of law, James B. White ex-
pounded a characteristic of legal discourse that supports the Malone thesis:
the tendency of legal conversations about rules to shift imperceptibly from
a language of description to a language of judgment.8 4
[A] legal rule . . . appears to be a language of description, which
works by a simple process of comparison, but in cases of any
difficulty it is actually a language of judgment, which works in
ways that find no expression in the rule itself. In such cases the
meaning of its terms is not obvious, as the rule seems to assume,
but must be determined by a process of interpretation and judg-
ment .... 85
Hence a rule of causation, whether but-for, substantial-factor, or some
other, is necessarily evaluative in its attempt to describe "what. in fact
happened." 8' As a consequence of this phenomenon, Dean Green's ab-
AN INTRODUCTION TO LocIC AND SCIENTIFIC METHOD (1934).
The search for "causes" may therefore be understood as a search for some
invariable order between various sorts of elements or factors. The specific nature
of this order will vary with the nature of the subject matter and the purpose
of the inquiry. Moreover, the specific nature of the elements between which the
order is sought will also differ for different inquiries ...
• . . In other words, the kind of order, as well as the kinds of elements we
look for, is determined by the nature of the problem which generates the inquiry.
Id. at 248-49.
82. Malone, supra note 2, at 62-64. Professor Malone was doubtless influenced by Pro-
fessors Felix S. Cohen and Ben F. Small, whose earlier essays arguing much the same thesis
he cited favorably. See id. at 62 n.3, 63 n.4.
83. See, e.g., Robinson, supra note 31. The great variety of opinion among courts
and commentators on the meaning of causation "owes something to different conceptions
of the purposes that causation serves in a liability system, which in turn are influenced
by different conceptions of the aims of liability itself." Id. at 714. Although in their book
on factual causation Professors Arno Becht and Frank Miller side with Green over against
Malone on the neutrality of cause-in-fact, they are compelled, in cases where causation is
so indeterminate as to be speculative, to agree with Malone, supra note 2, at 73, that any
causal decision will be normative, not positive. A. BECHT & F. MILLER, THE TEST OF FAC-
TUAL CAUSATION IN NEGLIGENCE AND STRICT LIABILITY CASES 81, 86, 120, 152 (1961).
84. White, The Invisible Discourse of the Law: Reflections on Legal Literacy and General
Education, 54 U. COLO. L. REv. 143, 147 (1983).
85. Id. at 148.
.86. See generally Borgo, Causal Paradigms in Tort Law, 8 J. LEGAL STUD. 419 (1979).
[Ojur selection of a particular antecedent condition as the cause of an event
. . . depends upon the role of the condition in the context in which the event
. . . occurs. . . . Our selection is also affected by the purpose for which we
choose the cause. . . . For what counts as a satisfactory explanation is in part
determined by the purpose for which it is demanded. Thus causal explanations,
and therefore our selection of causes, will vary with our purposes in making them.
Id. at 439. To say that the actor "caused" the harm is merely a familiar, condensed way
of saying that he alone wronged the victim. "Common sense notions of justice are at work
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solute bifurcation cannot be considered practically attainable or
philosophically accurate; for the words "fact" and "policy" are misleading
when used in ways that suggest a clean, clear distinction.
To give Green his due, however, he probably never intended his duty-
risk methodology to contain a philosophically accurate account of causality.
Rather, his atomism was a tactical necessity, an integral step in the crea-
tion of his duty-risk method: the naturally indivisible was split for pur-
poses of analysis. Green's bifurcation was an artificial but necessary divi-
sion of proximate cause-without the severance, the duty-risk scheme
would have collapsed and the campaign against proximate cause would
have been lost. 7 Therefore, the Greenian atomistic theory of cause-in-
fact stands not as an accurate account of causality but as an admonition
to the judge that he be aware of the differing requirements for the dif-
ferent components of the plaintiff's prima facie case and that he con-
sciously consider and use the relevant policy factors only at the "scope
of duty" stage of his deliberation. In short, Green's duty-risk method
required the bifurcation of proximate cause so that the crucial duty-
responsibility analysis would be clarified by its total separation from the
factual-cause inquiry.
Even Wex Malone concedes the force of Green's atomistic cause theory
as a useful analytical tool in tort litigation, for he too felt that judges
should not use the jargon of proximate cause to short-circuit the crucial
scope-of-duty inquiry.
Much difficulty can be avoided if it is borne in mind that cause
is exclusively a fact inquiry in which we are interested only in
what happened, or what might have happened. This by no means
suggests that the trier is invited to ignore policy limitations when
he eventually passes judgment. It does mean, however, that policy
and fact should be kept separate and that causation should be
maintained utterly devoid of any policy overtones. 8
here, not common sense notions of causation." Kelley, Causation and Justice: A Com-
ment, 1978 WASH. U.L.Q. 635, 640.
87. The artificial division of that which is by nature indivisible concerned Professor
Malone. "For the layman," Malone observed, "cause and purpose are a single blend."
Malone, supra note 2, at 66. Hence the bifurcation of those issues makes us "lose much
of the meaning of the very phenomenon we are investigating." Id. For the emphasis the
Legal Realists placed on process and method and how Leon Green's duty-risk analysis reflects
this trait, see Zwier, supra note 46, at 799-800.
88. Malone, supra note 30, at 371. See also W. MALONE & A. JOHNSON, WORKERS'
COMPENSATION LAW AND PRACTICE § 251 in 13 Louisiana Civil Law Treatise (2d ed. 1980).
"Causation-in-fact is properly a neutral inquiry, shorn of any policy implications. It is
established by the production of evidence limited to the sequence of events that actually
occurred, without addressing for the moment the question of what the law ought to do
about that sequence of events." Id. § 251, at 545-46 (footnote omitted). Professor Malone
expressed a similar, though not identical, view in his "Cause-In-Fact" essay.
When policy can be recognized openly as the dominating factor, ... the problem
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It will not do to reconcile this later view with the thesis of his "Cause-In-
Fact" essay by appealing to the passage of time; although Professor
Malone assented for purposes of analysis to Green's bifurcation, 9 one
must conclude by recognizing the psychological and practical realism of
his gestalt view of causation. Indeed, if Malone sometimes agreed with
Green, Green fully reciprocated. So compelling was Malone's study of
cause-in-fact that Dean Green approved its thesis; he admitted that in
the hard cases involving close causation calls, the judge and jury will be
greatly swayed by the concerns of fairness and social policy."
The Malone thesis, then, expresses a causal realism that is wanting
in Green's theory. As a matter of human psychology, the cause-in-fact
can be meaningfully labeled as one of proximate cause, duty, risk, negligence,
etc. On the other hand, when the attention of the trier is focused primarily on
what happened ... , the issue is properly termed one of simple cause [i.e., cause
in fact] although policy impulses may assist materially in giving the proper turn
to the judgment.
Malone, supra note 2, at 97.
89. It is beyond cavil that in his later works (and implicitly even in his "Cause-In-
Fact" essay, see supra note 88) Malone endorsed the Greenian belief that in the cause-in-
fact and legal-cause inquiries the word "cause" can meaningfully be assigned separate, distinct
meanings; but as Professor Zwier recognized, on this topic of bifurcation Malone's "analysis
is primarily ex post facto." Zwier, supra note 46, at 775 n.30. Hence Malone's endorse-
ment of Green's causal atomism is a matter of analytical, not philosophical, conviction;
he supported Green's theory as a principle of analysis, not as an axiom of ontology. As pro-
fessor Malone stated in conversation with the author, a proximate-cause/substantial-factor
charge is a perfectly acceptable and functional instruction to give a jury in view of their
tendency to decide the case as a whole. But in a bench trial or on appellate review, the
duty-risk analysis is the preferable, more functional mode of decision-making, since the
schooled, self-conscious professional should be better able to compartmentalize the case and
confine the bulk of society's policy imperatives within the "duty" segment of analysis. In-
terview with Wex S. Malone at the Paul M. Hebert Law Center, Baton Rouge, Louisiana
(Feb. 6, 1984). Thus it is not mere coincidence that the only state to adopt wholly and
wholeheartedly the duty-risk analysis is Louisiana, a mixed jurisdiction that inherited the
civilian custom of bench rather than jury trials in civil suits; for the duty-risk method is
best suited to bench trials or appellate review of facts (which amounts to the same thing).
Duty-risk analysis is therefore well-known in civilian jurisdictions as the purpose-and-scope-
of-legal-protection theory or the scope-of-rule theory. See Hayashida, The Necessity for the
Rational Basis of Duty-Risk Analysis in Japanese Tort Law: A Comparative Study, 1981
UTAH L. kv. 65, 79; Honor6, Causation and Remoteness of Damage, in 11 INTERNATIONAL
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF CoMPARATIVE LAw-TORTS ch. 7, at 60-63 (A. Tunc ed. 1983). For a
view contrary to the belief of Malone and Green that the judge can more effectively bifur-
cate proximate cause than can a jury, see Robertson, The Precedent Value of Conclusions
of Fact in Civil Cases in England and Louisiana, 29 LA. L. REv. 78 (1968) (arguing that
it is even easier for the law-fact distinction to be obscured in a bench trial than in a jury trial).
90. Green, supra note 2, at 554-55, 555 n.29, 560-61; Green, supra note 21, at 606
("As a matter of fact, when a case is submitted to a jury, however clearly marked may
be the issues which the jury are supposed to answer, I have always felt that in most in-
stances they give their answer on the whole case."); see also Twerski, supra note 27, at
414; Weinrib, supra note 41, at 530.
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decision is instinct with norms and evaluation."' As Malone and other
commentators have pointed out,92 the evaluative process occurs even within
the mechanical but-for test. Every effect is preceded by an overwhelming
array of causes and conditions, so the trier-of-fact must discern and follow
the pertinent thread in the labyrinthine causal pattern if the but-for or
substantial-factor or any other causal test is to serve its screening and
retributive-justice ends. Only through an evaluative sifting can we segregate
the causa causans-the dramatic cause that catches and keeps our
interest 9 -from the numerous other causes and conditions that make up
the background or operative field of the causa causans. Without
preliminary evaluation, any causal test, even the mechanical but-for test,
will be reduced to absurdity, defining "cause" so broadly that we are
left with what Glanville Williams dubbed "Adam-and-Eve causation." 94
Malone's telling insight was the realization that normative factors must
always play a greater or lesser role in the causal determination. Thus,
cause-in-fact is not simply a fact, but comprises a congeries of physical
relations and purposive deductions; the causal determination is not a
neutral inquiry but a forensic method of reasoning." Cause-in-fact is a
process, not an event.
91. For implicit support of the Malone thesis (and express support of Epstein and Borgo
over against Calabresi and the Coaseans) through an application of Jean Piaget's work
on causality to the law of tort, see Gjerdingen, The Coase Theorem and the Psychology
of Common-Law Thought, 56 S. CAL. L. REV. 711 (1983).
92. See Probert, supra note 6, at 375 ("[W]e believe we may separate the fact (cause)
from the value (responsibility), forgetting that the fact arose somewhere in time out of a
value judgment ...."). Concerning the analogous topic of bifurcation, Professor Probert
stated: "The bifurcation of proximate cause has created some further classification prob-
lems of its own, perhaps because the very split is tenuous." Id. at 377. See also Weinrib,
supra note 41, at 529-33 (arguing factual causation, like proximate cause, is fundamentally
a value-freighted concept).
93. See Borgo, supra note 86, at 432-33, 439-40; Williams, supra note 50, at 63.
94. Williams, supra note 50, at 64. "[A]n inquiry into factual causation must be made
with an object in view, because all the causal antecedents of an event (especially if non-
happenings are included as causes) are too numerous to be catalogued or investigated or
thought about." Id. at 65. And in a study of nuisance law, Richard Epstein implicitly
acknowledged the normative nature of cause-in-fact when he criticized R.H. Coase's ap-
plication of the concept of "joint causation by co-tortfeasors" to the conduct of defendant
and plaintiff.
The weakness of [Coase's] position is its failure to recognize that for legal pur-
poses the question of causation can be resolved only after there is an acceptance
of some initial distribution of rights.
... The clear distribution of rights is precisely what makes it possible to make
a unique determination of what conduct is causally relevant and what is not.
Epstein, Nuisance Law: Corrective Justice and its Utilitarian Constraints, 8 J. LEGAL STUD.
49, 58, 60 (1979). Cf. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J. LAW & EcON. 1 (1960).
95. Cf. W. MALONE & A. JomsON, supra note 88, § 251, at 546 (maintaining that
the "fact of causation" is never proved absolutely, only as a probability). Cf also R.
CHISHOLM, THEORY oF KNOWLEDGE 7-9, 111-13 (1966).
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Conclusion
The gestalt philosopher Wolfgang Koehler entitled one of his books
The Place of Value in a World of Facts.96 From the viewpoint of human
experience, however, a more accurate title would have been The Place
of Facts in a World of Value; for we find it as hard to grasp a fact
as a snark, while at the same time everyone has values and applies them
constantly. Malone wisely tempered Green's atomistic causation by ap-
plying his gestalt view to the forensic pursuit of cause-in-fact. He knew
that since "value" necessarily colors our perceptions, it was a simplistic
legal description that endeavored to discover facts by blanching away all
evaluative hues. Malone's insight was that in all stages of a difficult tort
case fact and value shade one into the other. He recognized that value
is often the sovereign element of our perceptual experience: the values
inherent in a judge's or jury's mindset can erode fact just as the Impres-
sionists' colors eroded form.
Thus, Professor Malone's exposition of the forensic, purposive
character of cause-in-fact will provide sound guidance for the Louisiana
Supreme Court should that tribunal undertake to examine the goals of
tort causation and declare the preferred tests of factual cause for bench
and jury trials.97 The supreme court has effected revolutionary changes
in Louisina tort law over the past two decades by its adoption of the
Greenian duty-risk analysis. It is time to consolidate and complete the
revolution by incorporating within that analysis Wex Malone's approach
to cause-in-fact.
James E. Viator
96. W. K6hler, The Place of Value in a World of Facts (1938).
97. The current Supreme Court of Louisiana should not feel radical if it decides to
recognize and apply Malone's teachings about the evaluative nature of cause-in-fact; in 1919
the supreme court wrote an opinion that can be fairly considered a classic model of the
purposive causal determination. The sudden jerking of a streetcar knocked a passenger from
his feet, and he landed on the small of his back. Although an autopsy showed that the
victim had tuberculosis, chronic nephritis, acute chronic cystitis, acute chronic prostatitis,
chronic selenitis, and sacral cancer, the court unblushingly held that "the cause of Mr.
Thompson's suffering, sickness, and death was . . . the existence of a malignant tumor,
brought about by the blow which he received on falling on one of defendant's cars." Thomp-
son v. New Orleans Ry. & Light Co., 145 La. 805, 815, 83 So. 19, 22 (1919).
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